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Abstract: 
This paper estimates the financial returns to higher education quality in the UK. To 
account for the selectivity of students to institution, we rely on a selection on 
observable assumptions. We use several estimates including the Generalised Propensity 
Score of Hirano and Imbens, which relies on a continuous measure of institutional 
quality. This highlights that the returns to quality are heterogenous, and mostly driven 
by high quality institutions. Moving from an institution in the 3
rd
 quality quartile to a 
top quality institution is associated with a 7% increase in earnings. 
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I Introduction 
Reports of high financial returns to higher education are often trumpeted by 
stake holders to promote attending higher education. A considerable amount of 
empirical evidence supports this claim but there are far less evidence on the 
variability of this return
1
, and how it is affected by the quality of the educational 
input. In general, sorting whereby more able students are selected by more selective 
institutions and earn more in the labour market (Hoxby, 2009) generates a positive 
correlation between institutional quality and future earnings. Thus naïve estimates, 
assuming random allocation of students to institutions, are severely upward biased. 
Whether returns differ by institution is crucial to inform prospective students about to 
invest in tertiary education. This paper provides estimates of the effect of institutional 
quality on early career earnings in the UK using several identification strategies, 
including, for the first time in this context, the Generalised Propensity Score (Hirano 
and Imbens, 2004).  
While graduates from higher quality institutions earn more (see James et al, 
1989 for early evidence) whether this is due to the quality of the institution remains 
debatable. Assuming that the better inputs improve educational attainment
2
, the 
human capital model predicts that graduates from higher quality institutions will be 
more productive and obtain higher wages. In fact, even in the absence of increased 
human capital, graduates may obtain higher wages if these institutions endow them 
with a set of peers that improve their job prospects. However, there are reasons to 
believe that the positive correlation between institution quality and graduate earnings 
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 The Economist (05
th
 April 2014) suggests that some US colleges have even negative financial returns. 
2
 Bowman and Mehay (2002) find a positive effect of attending private and higher-rated institutions on 
appraisal and promotion, consistent with the earnings effects estimated elsewhere. Robst (1995) also 
reports that graduates from higher ranked institutions are less likely to experience over-education. 
Smith (2013) using twins also reports that quality reduces drop-out.  
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is not causal. As in a signalling model, students may attend more selective institutions 
to signal their greater ability to future employers
3
.  
 Obtaining unbiased estimates of the effect of higher education quality on 
earnings is difficult since students and institutions select each other, and the 
characteristics, observable or not, which affect these choices are also correlated with 
labour market outcomes. To account for selection, researchers have relied on adding 
controls for students’ ability (Brewer et al. 1999), matching models (Black and Smith, 
2004, 2006), instrumental variable (Long, 2008), twins/family fixed effects (Behrman 
et al., 1996; Lindahl and Regnér, 2009), regression discontinuity (Hoekstra, 2009; 
Saavedra, 2009) or pairing students applying to the same institution (Dale and 
Krueger, 2002, 2014; Broecke, 2012). Here, we rely on different strategies assuming 
selection on observables, including propensity score matching and Generalised 
Propensity Score (GPS); i.e. we assume that the observed match of a student to an 
institution is based on observable characteristics. Part of the selection process is 
unknown to us: whether to attend tertiary education, which institution to apply to. 
However, conditional on applying, the centralised application system in use in the UK 
makes the assumption of selection on observable characteristics of the prospective 
student plausible. The UK is characterised by a centralised application system, 
whereby all prospective students complete the same standardized form, and 
institutions base their decision to accept or not a student only on this information
4
. In 
the data at our disposal, we have (almost) the same information than the admission 
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 Distinguishing between the mechanisms is relevant for policy. Only if the premium is generated by an 
increase in human capital does the economy gain from institutional quality, and there is then some 
possible justification for subsidizing students to attend higher quality institution. If the returns are only 
due to signalling or networking, then the returns to quality are only private. The data available to us do 
not offer opportunities to test these hypotheses convincingly Hershbein (2013) proposes a test of the 
origin of the returns to attend more selective institutions and argues that selectivity provides a positive 
signal to employers. Jawagushi and Ma (2008) provide some evidence supporting human capital 
4
 There are a few exception to this general rule, which we explain later 
 4 
officers, which makes the assumption of selection on observable plausible
5
. Compare 
to a propensity score matching estimate, GPS allows us to capture the heterogeneity 
in the returns to quality, by estimating the effect of educational quality at all points of 
the quality distribution.  
The debate on the effect of institutions on earnings has received a large 
amount of attention in the U.S. where the market for higher education is fiercely 
competitive, but much less in the rest of the world. There are a few empirical 
evidences for the U.K. but their results are somehow ambiguous. To inform this 
debate, we use survey data pertaining to the 2003 cohorts of graduates, which is 
linked to administrative data so that background information on the students and 
academic performance can be added. Another difficulty in this literature is to measure 
quality as there is no agreement on which input matters. We measure institutional 
quality as the principal component of a set of education inputs: Research Assessment 
score, student/staff ratio, academic expenditures per student, mean entry grade and 
graduate prospect, which are commonly used to create league tables. 
We demonstrate that there is considerable heterogeneity in returns to quality, 
with almost no returns for below median quality institutions and large returns for 
attending the most prestigious institutions. This is consistent with theoretical 
predictions that as attendance to college increases, returns to quality increase (Hoxby, 
2009). Due to this strong non-linearity, OLS estimates are biased upwards and 
considerably larger than those obtained by GPS. Defining quality as a discrete step 
function somehow helps to capture the non-linearity. The larger impact of higher 
education quality at the high end of the distribution is also present in quantile 
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 Some institutions, typically Oxford and Cambridge universities, as well as medical, dentistry and 
veterinary schools also rely on an interview to assess the suitability of the candidates. We conduct 
robustness checks excluding these graduates. 
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regressions, thus graduates with the higher earning potentials are the one who benefit 
the most from attending a high quality institutions. 
 The rest of the paper is organised as follow. Section 2 reviews the U.S. and 
non-U.S. literature on the financial returns to higher education quality. In Section 3 
we discuss the institutional background as well as the data. Section 4 presents the 
estimators used in the analysis. The results are available in Section 5 and a discussion 
on the robustness checks and the implication of the returns is found in Section 6. 
 
II Literature review 
The literature on the effect of higher education quality on earnings originated 
from the U.S.. One of the first studies to account for selection of students between 
institutions of different quality is Brewer et al. (1999). They conclude that even 
correcting for selection into the type of university attended (identified by net tuition 
costs), prestigious private institutions provide significantly higher financial returns 
compared to low cost public institutions, but there are little returns to attending an 
elite public institution. Black and Smith (2004) confirm that fee differentials are in 
line with quality differentials, but criticise the parametric approach adopted in the rest 
of the literature, especially the linearity assumption, and instead recommend using 
propensity score matching. Their main results pertain to the wage differential between 
graduates from institutions in the top and bottom quarter of the quality distribution. 
This large quality gap makes the assumption of selection on observable potentially 
problematic, and may not represent the typical choice of students who are more likely 
to arbitrate between institutions of more similar quality. They report premium of 12% 
for men and 7% for women for attending a better quality institution. When estimating 
the wage differential between students from the second and third quality quartile 
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compared to the lowest one, the estimated quality effect was small and statistically 
insignificant for men and around 12% for women.  
However, students’ unobservable characteristics may still bias these estimates 
upwards; for example, if more motivated students attend more prestigious institutions 
and also, independently of the institution quality, earn higher wages. Dale and 
Krueger (2002, 2014), use information on all applications to a selection of high 
quality institutions, linked to Social Security Administration records. To control for 
selectivity on unobservable, they compare students who applied to the same 
institutions but went to different colleges. They find no financial return to attending a 
more selective institution, maybe due to the homogeneity of institution quality in the 
dataset used (30 highly selective institutions only). They report substantial returns to 
quality for ethnic minority students, which they reckon, could stem from these 
students obtaining a network of peers which boosts their career prospect. Hoekstra 
(2009) uses data on all applicants at a large state university and identifies the quality 
premium from a regression discontinuity; i.e comparing the earnings at age 28 to 33 
of applicants that barely made it, to those of applicants that just failed. The earning 
premium reaches 20% but this may have little external validity. An alternative 
strategy to account for unobservable characteristics is to rely on twins who attend 
different institutions. Behrman et al. (1996) find significant wage differentials 
between female twins who attended colleges that differ along various measures of 
quality
6
. 
With the exception of Dale and Krueger (2002, 2014) all studies report 
significant premium to attending a more prestigious institutions, and that OLS 
estimates are positively biased by selection. It is however unclear how much can be 
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 Smith (2013) found that attending an institution with a 100 point higher median SAT score, increases 
the probability of graduating by 5%. This estimate is similar when estimating a between twins model.  
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extrapolated from US evidence since in other countries the market for higher 
education tend to be more regulated. Evidence from other countries is scarcer. Papers 
using administrative registries from Sweden and various identification strategies 
report positive effect of institutional quality on graduate earnings (Lindahl and 
Regnér, 2009; de Luna and Lundin, 2014)
7
. However, no returns to the selectivity of 
the institutions are found in Australia, Finland or Japan (Birch et al, 2009; Suhonen 
2012, Nakamuro and Inui, 2012, respectively).  
 Amongst British evidence, Hussain et al. (2009) exploit various graduate 
cohorts and a set of quality variables. When combining all measures of quality, an 
increase of one standard deviation in quality is associated with a wage premium 
ranging from 2.5% to 5.5%, increasing for the more recent cohorts. They account for 
selection by including measures of student’s ability. Chevalier and Conlon (2003) use 
propensity score matching to estimate the effect of university quality on the earnings 
of three cohorts of graduates (1985, 1990 and 1995). Their measures of quality are an 
indicator of appurtenance to a self-selected pressure group of prestigious universities 
(Russell Group) and an indicator for when the institution was granted university 
status
8
. Graduating from the most prestigious institution is associated with a wage 
premium ranging from 1% to 6% but there is no significant difference between the 
earnings of graduates at old and new institutions.  There is also some evidence that 
the premium for attending the higher quality institutions increases for more recent 
cohorts suggesting that as the number of graduates expanded employers may have 
used institution prestige to differentiate between candidates. Chevalier and Conlon 
(2003) also estimate the effect of institution quality on wage growth and reports that 
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 Lindahl and Regnér (2009) use a between-sibling estimates to reduce the bias due to unobserved 
characteristics and estimate that in Sweden OLS estimates are twice as large as the within family 
estimates, suggesting a large bias in regressions not correcting for selectivity.   
8
 Eliasson (2007) uses the same dichotomy as a proxy for institution quality in Sweden. Propensity 
score estimates reveal no effect of institution quality on earnings four to nine years after graduation. 
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the effect of institution quality on earnings is stable (for the first 10 years after 
graduation).  Broecke (2012) uses administrative data for a cohort of school lever and 
their full record of university applications. He matches students who were accepted to 
the same institution but were one failed to gain the grades to satisfy the conditional 
offer and reports that a one standard deviation improvement in quality leads to a 7% 
increase in wages 3 years after graduation.  
Finally, Black and Smith (2006) also highlight that the estimate of quality is 
likely to be biased downwards by measurement error. Most studies have estimated 
quality by relying on the average SAT scores of attending students, but since quality 
is likely to be multi-dimensional this is only a proxy for the institutional quality. 
Instead, Black and Smith (2006) recommend using an array of quality measures 
and/or estimation techniques that account for measurement error (IV, GMM, 
Bounds). 
 
III Institutional background and data description 
The Longitudinal Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (LDLHE) was 
conducted in November 2006 amongst a random sample of students who graduated in 
the summer of 2003. The survey is conducted in two stages. First, the universe of all 
higher education leavers is sampled six months after graduation (75% response rate). 
In the second stage, a 55,900 sample is selected to take part in the longitudinal study. 
The response rate at this second stage is typical of postal survey (44%) and Tipping 
and Taylor (2007) provide evidence in favour of the representativity of the survey. 
Survey weights are used throughout the analysis. 
 The LDLHE is linked to administrative data from the Higher Education 
Statistical Agency so that additional information on secondary schooling and 
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university achievements, as well as family background can be added.  We select first 
degree holders, aged 18 to 25 on graduation, non-special entry students and who are 
currently observed in employment, with valid earning information. Since hours of 
work are not available in the survey, the labour market outcome of interest is annual 
earnings. We thus drop part-time workers. We also drop 21 individuals with self-
reported earnings above £60,000 (in 2006) three years after graduation so as to reduce 
measurement error. This leads to a sample of 6,986 observations. (See Table A1 for 
details on the sample selection). 
We supplement the dataset with measures of institution quality. There is no 
unambiguous measure of institution quality in the UK. All major newspapers provide 
annual university ranking differing in their methodology. We use information 
collected from the “Good University Guide”9, the longest running provider. Rather 
than using the ranking we compute a quality measure based on the first principal 
component along five dimensions of quality for 113 institutions: Research 
Assessment score, student/staff ratio, academic expenditures per student, mean entry 
grade and graduate prospect, which we then normalise to a mean of 0 and a standard 
deviation of 1. The first three variables measure the quantity and quality of the input, 
the mean entry grade is a measure of the selectivity and popularity of the institution 
but also captures the quality of peers. This has been widely used as a measure of 
institution quality. The last measure of quality is the probability that graduates are in 
further studies or graduate employment six months after leaving university and 
reflects the employers/universities view on the institution quality. The variables 
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The Good University Guide is one of the providers of ranking of universities. Rather than using its 
ranking, we only use the raw variables which can be obtained from: 
http://www.thegooduniversityguide.org.uk. 48 institutions not reporting all the covariates used to 
compute the quality score are thus excluded. They are mostly small specialised colleges and represent 
876 observations.  
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pertain to data collected for the academic year 2000, when the students applied and 
the 2001 Research Assessment Exercise.  The quality is computed at the level of the 
institution and not specifically for the subject studied. It can be argued that this is the 
appropriate level of aggregation to measure higher education quality for labour 
market related outcomes since employers may have knowledge of institutional quality 
but not subject specific quality. The first principal component accounts for 70% of the 
variation in quality. The resulting ranking appears plausible with the top five 
institutions (in alphabetical order) being: Cambridge, Imperial College London, 
London School of Economics, Oxford, and University College London. It also 
compares favourably with other measures of quality that have been used. For 
example, the mean quality score is significantly different for Russell group 
institutions (2.42), a group of the most prestigious institutions, the “group 1994”, a 
second tier of research institution (1.42) and the remaining institutions (-1.14). 
Indeed, the distribution of quality appears bimodal (Figure 1) and is characterised by 
a long tail at the high quality end. The lower part of the distribution is mostly formed 
of the new institutions which were granted university status in 1992. 
  [Figure 1: Here] 
It is unclear what the driver of the quality differences are. UK institutions are 
charities whose teaching activities are funded by a block grant and tuition income. 
The grants are a function of the number of students weighted by subject types. In 
England, tuition fees are capped for home and EU students (currently at £9,000) but 
are uncapped for non-EU students. As such, teaching funding differs by the mix of 
subject offered and the share of non-EU students. The latter varies from 0% to 40% 
and may be a driver of quality differences. The other sources of incomes are research 
income, which also varies dramatically by institutions – the Russell group institutions 
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for examples accrue 75% of the research grants income
10
; however the extent that this 
income is used towards teaching is unknown. Endowment and other type of charitable 
contributions are very small, representing less than 1% of the sector income and are 
unlikely to generate variations in funding between institutions (UniversitiesUK, 
2011). 
 
Figure 2 confirms that in the absence of any additional control there is a positive 
relationship between the institution quality and the average earnings of graduates. In 
fact, two clusters can be distinguished. At below median quality, there is little 
variation in earnings between institutions. For institutions with positive quality score, 
the relationship between quality and graduate earnings is much stronger. The graph 
thus highlights that the relationship between institutional quality and graduate earning 
is convex, rather than linear. OLS estimates, which rely on a linearity assumption 
between quality and earnings may thus be biased. The differences in wages by quality 
are substantial. Moving from an institution in the bottom tiers to a top five institution 
is associated with 50% higher wages.  
  [Figure 2- Here] 
The second relationship that we need to investigate is the amount of sorting 
between the academic ability of students and the quality of institutions. As stated 
previously, if the sorting was perfect it would not be possible to identify the effect of 
institution quality. However, the allocation mechanism of students to institutions in 
the UK, offers scope for some heterogeneity in the composition of the student body 
by institution. The admission process to the 134 universities is centralised. From the 
autumn to the spring preceding their admission to university, high school pupils fill a 
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 www.russellgroup.ac.uk/research - accessed on 25th July 2014. 
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standard form on-line at the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS). 
Prospective students can state a maximum of six choices (institution, subject) on this 
application
11
. Since students have imperfect information on their ability (Chevalier et 
al. 2007 or Furnham, 2001, for a review), the restricted number of applications means 
that one strategy to guarantee access to higher education is for some students to apply 
to institutions spanning the quality range. UCAS then send this form to all chosen 
institutions/departments which decide whether or not to make an offer to the 
prospective students. As such, all institutions decide simultaneously, based on exactly 
the same information. Note that at this point, candidates have not yet sat their end of 
secondary education exams (usually A-levels). Instead, the decision to offer a place at 
an institution is based on the teacher’s prediction of grades at this high stake exam 
and previous grades. The offers are typically conditional on applicants reaching a pre-
determined score in their, still to come, high stake exams
12
. When all institutions have 
responded, the applicant has to keep only one offer, and choose another one as an 
insurance choice, in case she does not reach the standards required by her preferred 
conditional offer.  
In August preceding the start of the academic year, the high-stake exam 
results are revealed. Conditional offers are confirmed or terminated. There is no 
possibility to trade-up, i.e. candidates who over-performed are locked in their 
accepted offer, and may thus be observed in institutions of lower quality compared to 
                                                 
11
 Students applying to medical, dentistry and veterinary schools, as well as candidates to Cambridge 
and Oxford universities, who can apply only to one or the other institution but not both,  can only state 
four choices. These applications need to be received earlier on in the cycle, typically in the October of 
the year preceding their entry to higher education.  Since 2008, the number of choice has been further 
restricted to 5. There is also a slightly different application process for performing arts courses.  
12
 Applicants can also apply with other qualification than A-levels. UCAS creates a score to harmonise 
grades at different type of qualifications. For the remaining of the paper, we will refer to the score at 
the exams warranting entrance at the university as the entry score. 
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their peers whose high exam performance was correctly predicted
13
. Pupils who fail 
to achieve the requirements of their first choice are committed to their insurance 
choice. For those who also fail the requirement of their insurance choice, a clearing 
mechanism allocates candidates to institutions that still have places on their courses. 
About 10% of successful applicants gain access through clearing. These clearing 
places are allocated on a first come first serve basis – as long as academic credentials 
are appropriate. A candidate who was accepted in a high quality institution but 
marginally failed to achieve the required score may at this stage only be able to 
register in a lower quality institution. Institutions which under-recruited may at this 
stage lower the recruitment threshold, leading to lower ability students being accepted 
to high quality institution. This allocation mechanism of students to institutions 
makes it credible that while selection is based on academic merit, it is imperfect and 
creates the potential for mismatch between student’s ability and institutional quality.  
The LDHLE is linked to administrative data so that we observe the same 
information as universities do when deciding whether or not to make an offer, with 
the exception of the entry score, for which we observe the realisation rather than the 
prediction
14
. However, since realised scores determine whether the offer is upheld or 
not, they contain the relevant information to match students to the institution they 
attend. 
Average attainment differs widely between students at colleges of different 
quality. At the top quartile institutions the average entry score is 23.60 out of 30, 6 
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 The possibility to continue searching after having an offer confirmed will be offered to applicants in 
2014. 
14
 The compulsory fields on the UCAS form are name, gender, age, address, country of birth, 
nationality, financing, disability, ethnicity, occupational background of parental figure if under 21 and 
previous school attended, which we also obtain when linking the survey to administrative data. The 
UCAS form also includes previous qualification, references – typically for the pupils’ teacher – the 
student personal statement and their predicted exam results if still currently in high school. This 
information is not available in our dataset, and instead we have the realised score We do not know 
which institutions a candidate applied to, nor what their decision was. 
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points more than in the third quartile and 14 points more than in below median 
institutions (Table 1). Figure 3 plots the distribution of entry score by quality quartile. 
Clearly the allocation of students to institution is not random; and the distribution of 
test scores shift to the right for every quartile of institutional quality. The top quality 
institutions recruit almost no students with below average ability, and have a more 
compressed distribution of ability; this is expected since low performers would not 
have received an offer if correctly predicted or would have seen their conditional offer 
elapsed. However, a small fraction of high ability students are found in the lowest 
quality institution. The sorting is thus asymmetrical which is consistent with the 
recruitment procedure highlighted above. While common support is universal, the 
support is thin in the tail of the distribution. These conclusions of asymmetric sorting 
and thin common support are similar to Black and Smith (2004) for the US.  
[Figure 3 – Here] 
Students at institutions of different quality differ along other dimensions too. 
Table 1 reports the means for all variables reported by applicants on their application 
form. Students at the highest quality institutions have in general more favourable 
characteristics. For example they are four times less likely not to have a reported entry 
score, three times more likely to have parents in manager or professional occupations, 
and 10 times more likely to have been educated at a private school than students at the 
lowest quality quartile institutions. Living with parents while studying reduces the 
choice of institutions that a student can apply; students at the top institutions are three 
times less likely to be living with their parents. The differences in student 
characteristics between institutions are thus consequent.  
The survey has only one measure of income: self-reported yearly income three 
years after graduation. As highlighted in Figure 1, institution quality is associated 
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with wage differential and students from the top quartile institutions earn 25% more 
than their peers at the lower end of the quality distribution. The wage gap appears 
especially large between 3
rd
 and 4
th
 quality quartiles. Moving from quartile 1 to 2 and 
to 3 is associated with an average wage increase of £1,000 but moving from 3 to 4 the 
gap is more than three times as large. Quality effects may thus be heterogenous.  
 
IV Empirical strategies 
We conduct the analysis using several empirical strategies. The first is to estimate 
the effect of institution quality on log earnings (ln Y) by Ordinary Least Squares. 
Typically, the estimated model would be of the form: 
  231210ln XXQY       (1) 
where Q is a measure of university quality, X1 a set of individual characteristics 
on graduation, including a measure of the student pre-enrolment ability, and X2 a set 
of current characteristics. X2 can be considered endogenous as the university quality 
may affect various dimensions of the labour market attainment of graduates. In the 
application, X2 contains only indicator of the regional labour market conditions (126 
post code for work location). Note that standard errors are clustered at the institution 
level to account for possible correlations between observations.  
The parameter of interest is 1  which represents the increase in earnings due to 
an increase in university quality. As stated previously 1  may be biased, even if (1) 
includes all confounding factors correlated with both quality and earnings, if the 
relationship between quality and earnings is non-linear and if there is a lack of 
common support (in which case the identification is purely due to the imposed 
functional form). The first limitation can be eliminated by measuring quality in a non-
linear form: a set of dummies, or a polynomial function for example.  
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(1) can also be estimated by quantile regression in order to test for heterogeneity 
in the effect of institutional quality on earnings which have been highlighted in the 
descriptive statistics. So that for each quantile p of the wage distribution we can, 
following Koenker and Basset (1978), define the conditional quantile of the 
distribution as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 0 1 2 1 3 2ln / , , ( )
p p p p p pQ Y Q X X Q X X Q           (2) 
and impose the restriction that ( ) ( ) 0pQ    to estimate the quartile specific 
parameters. 
To test for common support, we also estimate model (1) by propensity score 
matching (PSM), where, quality is measured as a binary variable. The parameter of 
interest is then the mean differences in wages between graduates who attended a high 
quality institution compared to those who did not but who, based on their observable 
characteristics, could have done so, this can thus be considered an Average Treatment 
on the Treated (ATT). If we define Y1 the wage if attended a high quality institution 
and Y0 the wage if attended another institution, and D is an indicator of having 
graduated from a high quality institution then the parameter of interest is simply: 
  1 0 / 1ATT E Y Y D          (3) 
ATT can be estimated if )1/( 0 DYE , which is never observed, can be 
approximated. If the allocation of students to universities is not random, then 
   0/1/ 00  DYEDYE . However, if it can be argued that the selection is based 
on observable characteristics (X) then the earnings of non-treated individuals can be 
used as counterfactual to approximate the unobserved earning of treated individuals if 
they had not been treated, i.e. conditional on this set of variables X an observation can 
be considered randomly allocated to either the treatment (high quality institution) or 
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the control group (    0 0/ , 1 / , 0E Y X D E Y X D   ). Formally, this is expressed in 
the Conditional Independence Assumption:  XDY /0  . Since we observe almost 
the same information as universities do when they make an offer to a student the 
assumption of selection on observable is plausible. The only difference in the set of 
observables is that universities make their offer using the results of past exams and the 
predicted grades at A-levels while we observe the realised A-levels grades. We do not 
have access to the predicted grades, nor the breakdown of the entry score by subjects. 
However, since the realised grade, not the predicted one, guarantees the access to 
higher education it is in fact the most relevant information to base our matching. 
Both OLS and matching produce unbiased estimates as long as the selection 
into institution of high quality is due to observed variables, but matching also 
highlights potential bias due to lack of common support. Formally, the common 
support can be expressed as: 0< 1)/1Pr(  XD ; individuals with the same 
characteristics have a positive probability to be treated or non-treated. The probability 
of treatment is the propensity score which is used to match observations, rather than 
X, so as to reduce the dimentionality of the matching problem. Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983) show that it is equivalent to match on all the components of X or on 
Pr(D=1/X).  
For each treated individual i, the counterfactual outcome associated with no 
treatment is a weighted average of the outcomes from control observations, where the 
weights are a function of the distance between the treated and control observations’ 
propensity scores (using Epanechnikov kernel). If no match is found within a 
bandwidth, the treated observation cannot be matched which highlights the lack of 
common support discussed above. Black and Smith (2004) estimate the effect of 
moving from the bottom quartile of the quality distribution to the first quartile. Only a 
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fraction of students will consider switching from a bottom to a top quality institution, 
and the estimate may be of limited interest. Moreover, by considering institutions that 
are so different, the common support always become extremely thin. Instead, we 
estimate three effects: moving from the first to the second quality quartile, second to 
third and third to fourth.   
Finally, since quality is (almost) a continuous variable we extend the 
propensity score matching estimator to the case of continuous treatment (Hirano and 
Inbems,2004). The remaining part of this section draws heavily on this article.  The 
intuition behind Continuous Propensity Score Matching (CPSM) is rather similar to 
the dichotomous case. A Generalised Propensity Score (GPS) is calculated which is 
the density of the treatment (T) conditional on a set of covariates X: R=r(T,X), the 
GPS has similar properties to the propensity score in the dichotomous case, mainly it 
satisfies CIA, so that:    1 | ,X T t r t X  . 
A two-step procedure is then used to remove any bias due to differences in X. 
First, we estimate the conditional expectation of the outcomes as a function of the 
treatment (T) and the GPS:    , / ,t r E Y T t R r    . This regression function does 
not have a causal interpretation and is only used to calculate the dose response 
function (μ) in the second step.     , ,t E t r t X     . Computationally, we 
estimate the GPS by OLS (  ' 21/ ~ ,oT X N X    and calculate: 
 
1
2
'
22
1 1 ˆ ˆˆ exp
ˆ2ˆ2
oR T X 

 
    
 
     (4) 
In the second stage we estimate, again by OLS, the outcome as a function of a 
flexible function of the treatment and the GPS. Following Kluve et al. (2012) we 
estimate: 
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          (5) 
(5) is then used to estimate for a given level of treatment t, the average potential 
outcome. The dose response function is found by computing this last stage for all 
level of the treatment considered. Hirano and Imbens (2004) recommend 
bootstrapping to obtain standard errors of the estimates. Rather than the dose response 
function, we report its derivative: in our case the interpretation is the marginal return 
to university quality. We also compute the expected (log) earnings at all values of the 
treatment. 
As in the case of dichotomous treatment, the GPS is only valid if the matching 
leads to a balancing of the characteristics of the treated and untreated group; i.e. akin 
to an-post random allocation of treatment. To assess the balancing we follow two 
strategies. First, as in Hirano and Imbens (2004), we divide the institution quality 
variable into three terciles and test, for each variable, whether the GPS adjusted mean 
differs in one tercile compare to the other two. This is equivalent to testing that the 
conditional mean and the treatment indicator are independent (CIA) where r(t,X) is 
evaluated at the median value of the treatment within the tercile (t*). We follow 
Hirano and Imbens (2004) and test this hypothesis by blocking. For each tercile, we 
define five blocks defined by the quintile of r(t*,X). For each block we calculate the 
mean difference in X for observations (T = t) and (T t ), and combine these five 
mean differences, weighted by the number of observations in each block, to calculate 
a t-statistics of the statistical differences in the mean of X between treated and 
untreated observations in that tercile.  
Imai et al. (2008) suggest that such a test may have low power as the decrease 
in the t-statistics may be due to an increase in the variance rather than a reduction in 
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the difference in means (Balance Test Fallacy). Thus, we also conduct a second 
balancing test. Imai and van Dyk (2004) recommend to test the balancing of the 
covariates by regressing each covariate on the treatment variable and the predicted 
treatment E[T\X] and testing for the significance of the treatment. An alternative to 
this test is to regress each covariate on the treatment and the GPS, at different values 
of the GPS (Kluve et al. 2012). 
 
V Results 
As discussed above, the main criteria used by universities to accept applicants are 
their predicted score at a high stake exam but we use the realised score instead to 
control for students’ ability15. The decision to apply to universities of different quality 
may also be related to individual characteristics (sex, age, ethnicity, disability status) 
and other background characteristics (private school, parental occupational class, 
whether expect to live at home while studying and tuition fee status) which we 
include in the earning regression or in the matching process:. All these variables are 
available to universities when assessing a student’s application. We additionally 
control for region of origin and region of the institution attended. 
 
V-A Discrete measure of quality 
First, we recode the measure of university quality into a discrete measure to 
facilitate comparisons with previous research. Quality is then measured in quartiles of 
the continuous quality measure with the fourth quartile representing the highest 
quality. Table 2 reports estimates of (1) estimated by OLS for different specifications 
                                                 
15
 Gibbons and Chevalier (2007) find small differences between teacher assessments and realised 
scores at age 16 especially for pupils at the extremes of the ability distribution but these differences 
have no impact on subsequent pupil outcomes.  Hayward et al. (2005) report “reasonable accuracy” 
(+/- one grade) at A-levels and no impact of the error on higher education participation. 
 21 
of the covariates. In the first column, the only additional control is a set of postcode 
dummies to capture the characteristics of the local labour market. There are some 
marked institution quality effects and graduates from the top quality institutions earn 
20% more than those from the lowest quality institutions. This premium is only 8.4% 
for graduates from the 3
rd
 quality quartile and no significant premium is observed for 
graduates from the 2
nd
 quality quartile. However, these estimates are biased upwards 
since the ability of students is correlated both with institutional quality and earnings. 
Thus, the second column adds a cubic function of the entry score to control for ability. 
The estimates on the effect of quality are reduced by at least a third, confirming that 
there is a large amount of sorting of students by ability. Note that for students 
attending a 2
nd
 quartile institution, controlling for attainment does not alter the 
returns; i.e. the intake at these institutions are similar. The next column reports 
estimates that controls for various dimensions of the individual characteristics and 
socio-economic background, including region of origin and region of institution; this 
reduces the quality effect further, so that the premium to attending a top institution is 
halved compared to the original specification. The fourth column adds controls for 
subject of studies and degree grades since institutions of different quality may differ 
along these dimensions as well. Indeed there are marked differences in the 
distribution of subjects by quality of institution (Table A2). Medicine, all sciences and 
engineering degrees, law, Classics, Languages, history, Economics, are more likely to 
be taught at higher quality institutions. While Business, Communication, Creative 
Arts, IT, being more popular at lower quality institutions.  Controlling for subjects 
(and final grades) improves the precision of the estimates and reduces the gap further, 
so that they now range from 2.5% to 8.0%. Despite the rich set of controls significant 
quality differentials remain for institution above the median quality, and especially for 
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those in the top quality quartile, which suggests that differences in earnings cannot be 
fully explained by selection. 
     [Table 2 Here] 
 
We now estimate the institution quality effects by propensity score matching for 
three different treatments: attending an institution in the 4
th
 quality quartile rather than 
one in the third; a third quality quartile institution rather than a second; and a second 
quality quartile rather than a first. These treatments are likely to be similar to 
students’ alternatives when selecting universities. Propensity scores are estimated 
separately for each treatment. In each case, the controls are a cubic function of entry 
score, an indicator for having no reported score, gender and disability, dummies for 
age and ethnicity, proxies for financial constraints, subject dummies, and dummies for 
region of origin
16
. The matched samples are balanced for the treated and control 
groups on all characteristics. The common support is almost universal, between 94% 
and 99% of the treated are matched to some control observations but, the support 
tends to be thin for high value of the propensity score - see Figure 4 for an example 
when the treatment is attending a 4th quartile university rather than a third quartile 
university. Figures for the other treatment are similar. 
   [Figure 4 Here] 
The PSM estimates are reported in Table 3. The results confirm that returns to 
quality are only observed for above median institutions. Wages are 5% higher for 
graduates from the 4
th
 quartile over those from the 3
rd
 quartile. Those graduates also 
enjoy a premium of 4% over those who attended an institution from the 2
nd
 quartile.  
There is no difference in earnings between graduating from the bottom two quality 
                                                 
16
 It was not possible to control for region of institution since for some regions, there is only one 
institution in a given quality quartile. 
 23 
quartiles. The OLS and matching estimates lead to the similar conclusions; the effect 
of institution quality on earnings is non-linear, and only exists for above the median 
institutions. Note that the returns to quality are substantially larger when estimated by 
propensity score matching. For example, the returns to attending a 4
th
 quartile rather 
than a 3
rd
 quartile institution is 3.4 percent when estimating by OLS (0.08-0.046) but 
5.3% when estimated with propensity score matching. 
 
V-B Continuous measure of quality 
Rather than relying on discrete measures of quality the analysis is now conducted 
using a continuous measure. The lower panel of Table 2 reports the estimates on a 
quadratic function of quality for various specifications
17
. In the most parsimonious 
model, moving from one standard deviation from the mean quality increases earnings 
by 7.7%. However, as in the discrete case, adding further covariates considerably 
reduces this premium and in the most complete model this premium has been more 
than halved and reaches 3.4%. This estimate is doubled for an institution with a 
normalised quality score of 2, highlighting the non-linearity of the returns. A 
specification using a log quality measure was also tested, the estimated elasticity of 
quality then ranges from 0.12, for the most parsimonious model, to 0.05, for the full 
control one. Later we investigate the non-linearity of this relationship without 
imposing a functional form.  
Relying on a central tendency measure may be misleading. We thus additionally 
report estimates from quantile regressions. Rather than imposing that the effect of 
university quality is homogenous at all level of income, quantile regressions allows it 
to differ for different quantile of the income distribution. One may for example, 
                                                 
17
 A cubic function of institution quality was also estimated but neither the quadratic nor the cubic 
terms were ever statistically significant.  
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expect that individuals with higher earning potential may gain more from attending a 
higher quality institution. To simplify the interpretation of these estimates those 
estimates are based on a linear function of quality. 
For each decile the estimated effects are reported graphically in Figure 5. For the 
first six income deciles, the estimated effect of university quality lies at the bottom of 
the OLS confidence interval and average 0.046. The estimated returns to quality then 
jumps almost 1 percentage points to the OLS estimate for the seventh decile, and 
thereafter becomes a positive function of the income decile. However, only the 
estimate for the 9
th
 decile (0.078) is significantly different from the OLS estimate. 
Thus, there is a strong heterogeneity in the returns to institution quality but only for 
individuals at the top of the earnings distribution.   
   [Figure 5: here] 
The previous estimates using a continuous measure of university quality have 
assumed a random allocation of students to universities. We keep assuming that the 
allocation is based on observable characteristics but use the Continuous Treatment 
Matching method proposed by Hirano and Imbens (2004) to estimate the institution 
quality effect on the earnings of recent graduates, so that no functional form on the 
relationship is assumed. We first estimate the GPS by regressing a log transformation 
of the quality score on all the covariates used previously and computing GPS value 
using the normal distribution (4)
18
.  
The balancing properties of the estimated GPS are assessed in Table 4. Following 
Hirano and Imbens (2004), we first split the sample into three terciles with respect to 
the quality of the institution attended. The first three columns of Table 4, report for 
each covariate a t-test of the mean difference in one tercile (g) compare to the other 
                                                 
18
 We report results when a log transformation of the quality score is used since the log transformation 
is closer to a normal distribution which we use to compute the GPS. Estimates based on the 
untransformed quality score were also computed and do not substantially differ from those presented. 
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two groups. Clearly, there are marked differences between graduates from institutions 
at different level of the quality distribution, highlighting that selection of students take 
place. We then compute the GPS at the median value of the tercile and split the group 
into 5 blocks. Within each block, we compute the t-statistics of the difference in 
means between treated (went to an institution of quality g) and non-treated 
observations. Columns 4 to 7 report the weighted average t-statistics for each block. 
After conditioning on GPS, most mean differences between groups are dramatically 
reduced and insignificant. There remains a small significant difference in the highest 
A-level score category, parental background, school type and for medical graduates. 
We fare less well in balancing on regions of origin and region of origin with 9 tests 
being positive. Overall, we can still be pretty satisfied of the balancing, out of the 297 
tests conducted only 15 are significant, which is exactly the number of false positive 
expected with a 95% confidence interval.   
  [Table 4] 
Imai et al. (2008) suggest that such a blocking test may be subject to balance test 
fallacy. As an alternative balancing test, we also conduct the Imai and van Dyk (2004) 
test. In columns 7, we report for each covariate, the t-tests on the log treatment 
coefficient in an un-conditional regression. Those are large, indicating that covariates 
and quality are correlated. In column 8, we report the same t-test when we condition 
on the predicted value of the treatment.  Again we observe a large reduction in the 
value of the t-test but some remain above the critical value for significance. These 
concern the top of the ability distribution, school type, some subjects and the regional 
dummies. Kluve et al. (2012) recommend to run a similar test but conditioning on 
GPS values at the 25
th
, 50
th
 and 75
th
 percentile of the quality distribution instead 
instead. This test broadly confirms the Imai and van Dyk and is not reported here. We 
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have conducted these three tests for various specifications, including interactions of 
the various controls, but the conclusions are always the same. The blocking-test 
suggests that the after conditioning the samples are balanced while the other two tests 
highlights some balancing issues. Eyeballing the means and standard errors in the 
blocking test, it does not appear that the reduction in the t-tests when blocking is due 
to an inflation of the standard error. Since the blocking test assess the balancing over a 
finer range of the common support, we are satisfied that after conditioning on GPS the 
sample is balanced.  
To test for common support, we follow the procedure highlighted in Kluve et al. 
(2012). We split the sample into three tercile as previously. We then evaluate the GPS 
at the median quality value of group g for all observations. We replicate this 
procedure three times, once for each tercile. Figure 6 reports the distribution of GPS 
estimated at the median value of group g, for group g versus not group g. For each 
group, the GPS distributions overlap indicating common support. Note that the 
common support is thinner for the lowest and highest quality groups. 
   [Figure 6] 
 
Figure 7A reports the marginal effects of (log) institution quality on earnings 
throughout the distribution of treatment. The quality effect is convex and positive but 
for a large section in the lower part of the quality distribution, not actually 
significantly different from 0.  For institutions above the median quality, there are 
some positive returns to quality. Note that the return is increasing with quality, so that 
the highest quality institutions generate the highest return to quality. This may be 
better appreciated in Figure 7B which reports the expected log earnings over the 
quality distribution. The expected wage differentials are only significantly larger for 
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attending an institution in the top quartile of the quality distribution. The predicted 
wage differential between a graduate from the median 4
th
 quality quartile and one 
from the 3
rd
 quartile is 7%. 
 [Figure 7]  
In Table 5, we provide evidence that these results are robust. First, we eliminate 
institutions and subjects for which the selection process includes an interview 
(Oxford, Cambridge) or an additional test (Medical schools, Art schools) as this 
makes the assumption of selection on observable characteristics less palatable. This 
selection eliminates both high quality institutions from which there is a high premium 
to quality, and arts graduates which typically have low earnings. As such, the quality 
effect remains almost identical to those obtained on the full sample. Second, we 
assess whether there are gender differences in the returns to institution quality. The 
gender wage gap reaches £2,000 or nearly 10%. However, there are no significant 
differences in the returns to quality by gender. In fact, the CTM predicted wages 
suggest that the gender wage gap may open up for high quality institution graduate. 
The gender wage gap in predicted wage is around 6% for graduates from the bottom 
three quartiles but reaches 7.5% for graduates from top quartile institution. 
Finally, the last two columns assess the sensitivity of our results to alternative 
measures of quality. First, we eliminate graduate prospects as this is measuring a post-
university outcome. The second alternative is to additionally drop the research quality 
score, as this may not be directly related to teaching quality. The estimates tend to be 
somehow smaller, confirming that simpler measure of quality tend to reduce the 
returns to quality (Black and Smith, 2004). Overall, we are satisfied that our estimates 
are robust. Additionally, we have experimented with different transformation of the 
quality measure but the general conclusions remain the same. 
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  [Table 5] 
 
VI Discussion 
Using a wide array of estimators, we consistently find that there is a large 
amount of sorting to institution, the estimated quality effects are halved when 
including students’ characteristics (mostly ability). Secondly, institutions quality is 
associated with positive financial returns for graduates. While there are some 
differences on the size and the distribution of the effect, the overwhelming conclusion 
is that the quality effect is non-linear and accrues mostly to graduates from the highest 
quality institutions or with the best earnings credentials. The estimated returns to 
graduating from a top quartile institution as oppose to a third quartile one, range from 
3.5% to 5.5% when estimated by OLS or PSM. Our favoured estimates, GPS, are 
even larger reaching 7% for moving from the median quality of the third quartile to 
the median value of the fourth quartile. 
Graduates from a 3
rd
 quartile institution earn on average £22,785 per annum 
three years after graduation. We can compute the life time premium that would have 
been associated with these students graduating from a 4
th
 quartile quality institution 
instead. On average the difference in quality score between these institutions is just 
short of 1 standard deviation. Our favoured estimated effect in this quality range is 
7% (CTM). Assuming a growth rate of 2% over the life time, a 40-years long 
participation to the labour force, a discount rate of 3.5% and that the returns to quality 
are constant over the life-time, the differences in the present value of the life time 
earnings at 18 between a would-be graduate at a third quartile institution and one at a 
fourth quartile institution reaches £40,000. Since tuition fees are (almost) identical 
between all institutions – at the cap value stated by the government – there is no 
potential arbitrage for students between a high quality institution and a cheaper one, 
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so £40,000 is a net gain from attending a top quality institution. The current admission 
system is based on predicted grades and trap applicants in their initial choice. As such 
an applicant whose grades were wrongly predicted and could not get access to a top 
quality institution suffers from a large financial penalty over her life time.  
 
VII Conclusion 
We show that currently in the UK there is a wage premium to university 
quality. This premium is non-linear. There is no significant quality effect for 
institutions in the bottom half of the quality distribution but graduates from the most 
prestigious institutions earn 7% more than graduates from institutions in the 3
rd
 
quality quartile. These estimates are robust to an array of methods, all relying on 
selection on observables. Compare to other UK estimates, such as Broecke (2012) 
which accounts for selection on unobservable, our results are much lower, maybe 
because his sample is composed for higher ability individuals than the one used for 
this analysis. While smaller, the returns to quality still lead to some important 
differences in life time earnings. Policy makers may thus worry that the current 
system of fixed price between all institutions can be considered unfair towards 
students attending the lower quality institutions. The allocation system could also be 
revised to either be based on the final secondary education exam, rather than its 
prediction, or by allowing successful applicants to trade up if their exam results were 
better than expected. A remaining question is whether this premium stems from an 
increase in human capital, peers effects or signalling. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Institution Quality: 
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Note: Quality is measured as the principal component of research assessment, student staff ratio, 
academic expenditure, mean entry grade and graduate prospect. The dash line reflects the 
thresholds to the 1
st
, 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 quartile of the quality distribution. 
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Figure 2: University Quality and Mean Institutional Wage for Graduates 
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Note: The circle size represents the number of students at the institution. Mean wages are self-reported 
annual wages for full-time workers earning less than £60,000 three years after graduation. The line is 
based on a quadratic fit of university quality on earnings. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of Entry Exam Score by University Quality Quartile 
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Note: Distribution of entry exam score by quartile of institution quality. 
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Figure 4: Balancing Propensity Score  - Treatment (top quality quartile) and 
Control (3
rd
 Quality Quartile). 
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The propensity score includes an indicator of A-level score missing, a cubic in A-level score, gender, 
parental occupation categories, subject of degree, tuition fees status, accommodation status, disability, 
type of school attended, ethnicity and a set of dummies for age. 
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Figure 5: Estimated Returns to Institution Quality: Quantile regressions 
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Note: Darker dash lines indicate the 5% confidence interval for quantile estimates, grey dash lines 
indicate the 5% confidence interval for OLS estimate. 
Estimated model has the same specification than the most extensive models presented in Table 2, but 
where the categorical measures of institution quality have been replaced by a linear function of the 
normalised quality score. Regional dummies have been omitted as small number of observations in 
some categories prevented the model converging. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of GPS – Evaluated at the Median Value of the Treatment 
for each Quality Treatment Tercile 
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Note: Distribution of GPS estimated at the median university quality for the lowest 
GPS tercile (a) , medium tercile (b) and upper tercile (c) 
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Figure 7: Estimated Marginal Effects of Institution Quality on Earning.  
Continuous Propensity Score Matching 
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B] Predicted Wage to Log Quality 
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Note: Estimates of the marginal effect of institution quality on earnings from the 
Generalised propensity score matching. Dash lines represents the 95% confidence 
interval, obtained from 200 replications bootstrap. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics by University Quality Quartile 
 
Variable 
Quartile 
1 
Quartile 
2 
Quartile 
3 
Quartile 
4 
Male 0.42 0.43 0.47 0.45 
A-levels score 
13.41 
(6.21) 
15.65 
(6.03) 
21.49 
(5.84) 
25.61 
(5.03) 
A-levels score missing 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.03 
Parental occupation     
    Manager 0.11 0.17 0.22 0.26 
    Professional 0.09 0.14 0.22 0.34 
    Associate professional 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 
    Other 0.28 0.26 0.28 0.23 
    Not reported/no occ. 0.45 0.35 0.19 0.09 
Accommodation     
    University 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.20 
    Parents 0.27 0.24 0.14 0.08 
    Own 0.31 0.44 0.45 0.62 
    Other 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.09 
    Unknown 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.02 
Disable 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.03 
White
A
 0.78 0.84 0.88 0.86 
Age on graduation 
20.31 
(1.54) 
20.35 
(1.53) 
19.79 
(1.11) 
20.00 
(1.15) 
Labour market outcomes     
Ln salary 
20,683 
(6,113) 
21,005 
(6,183) 
22,785 
(7,403) 
26,655 
(9,112) 
Observations 1658 2001 1762 1551 
Note: Cells report means of variables and standard error in parentheses when the variable is 
continuous. The sample is weighted to account for survey structure. Only individuals currently working 
full-time and reporting earning less than £60,000 per annum are selected in the sample. 
A
 the analysis is conducted at a more disaggregated level and ethnicity is broken down between Black, 
Indian, Pakistani/Bangladeshi, other Asian, mixed, other ethnicity. 
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Table 2: OLS Financial Returns to Quality  
 
Discrete measure (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Quality 2 0.025 0.026 0.028* 0.025* 
 
(0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) 
Quality 3 0.084*** 0.065*** 0.053*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.015) 
Quality 4  0.205*** 0.141*** 0.093*** 0.080*** 
 
(0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.018) 
Location controls
A 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
A-level score (cubic function)  Yes Yes Yes 
Gender   Yes Yes 
Parental background   Yes Yes 
Other socio-eco 
characteristics
A
  
 
Yes Yes 
Subject of graduation    Yes 
Grade    Yes 
     
Adjusted R
2
 0.20 0.22 0.29 0.39 
Observations 6986  
 
Continuous measure (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Normalised Quality score 0.077*** 0.055*** 0.041*** 0.034*** 
 
(0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) 
Normalised Quality score
2
 0.009 0.003 0.007 0.009* 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Location controls
A 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
A-level score (cubic function)  Yes Yes Yes 
Gender   Yes Yes 
Parental background   Yes Yes 
Other socio-eco 
characteristics
A
  
 
Yes Yes 
Subject of graduation    Yes 
Grade    Yes 
     
Adjusted R
2
 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.38 
Observations 6986 
Note: standard errors reported into brackets adjusted for clustering at the institution level.  ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% statistical level respectively. 
A 
Location controls are a set of 126 postcodes to account for local labour market characteristics. The 
other socio-economic characteristics are age, ethnicity, disability status, school type, whether expect to 
live at home when studying and tuition fee status, dummies for region of origin and region of 
institution. 
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Table 3: Propensity Score Matching Estimates of University Quality on Earnings 
 
Treatment Q4-Q3 Q3-Q2 Q2-Q1 
    
Ln salary    
Treated 10.15 9.97 9.91 
Control 10.00 9.91 9.93 
    
    
Propensity score     
Matched treated 10.15 9.97 9.91 
Matched control 10.09 9.93 9.91 
ATT 0.053*** 0.036* 0.008 
 (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) 
    
% treated matched 99% 94% 99% 
% control used for matching
a 
86% 74% 89% 
Nbr of controls accounting for 
50% of match – Total number 
of controls used
a 
47/1526 35/1485 26/1857 
Observations 3,326 3,682 3,660 
Note: The propensity scores are estimated by a probit with the following covariates: an indicator of A-
level score missing, a cubic in A-level score, gender, parental occupation categories, subject of degree, 
tuition fees status, accommodation status, disability, type of school attended, ethnicity and a set of 
dummies for age on graduation, and region of residence.  
The matching estimators is based on Epanechnikov kernel matching with a bandwidth of 0.01 
a
 These statistics are based on a nearest neighbour matching with a caliper of 0.01 which are available 
upon request. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% statistical level respectively. 
Table 4: Balancing of the GPS covariates – t-statistics of mean difference  
 
 Unconditional  Conditional on GPS  Imai Test 
 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
 
Tier 1 Tier 2 Tier 3 
 
Uncond. Cond. 
Male 4.56 4.94 0.14 
 
0.53 1.38 0.58 
 
3.66 0.18 
A-level none 22.93 1.84 20.85 
 
1.27 0.22 1.30 
 
25.12 1.32 
A-level ]0,2] 6.42 1.50 4.88 
 
0.26 0.13 0.39 
 
6.75 0.84 
A-level ]2,4] 7.56 1.00 6.47 
 
0.62 0.17 0.92 
 
7.92 0.92 
A-level ]4,6] 4.71 2.33 6.92 
 
0.13 0.88 0.96 
 
8.28 0.89 
A-level ]6,8] 10.64 1.71 8.80 
 
0.36 0.09 1.01 
 
10.88 0.61 
A-level ]8,10] 9.64 0.15 9.65 
 
0.40 0.65 0.93 
 
11.71 0.77 
A-level ]10,12] 7.66 1.53 9.08 
 
0.10 0.71 0.93 
 
10.42 0.66 
A-level ]12,14] 5.94 3.71 9.51 
 
0.23 0.97 0.98 
 
10.06 1.15 
A-level ]14,16] 5.62 0.84 6.42 
 
0.43 0.00 0.48 
 
7.44 0.60 
A-level ]16,18] 0.32 4.95 5.10 
 
1.00 0.41 0.13 
 
4.13 2.57 
A-level ]18,20] 6.30 8.22 1.57 
 
0.75 0.90 0.30 
 
1.90 3.02 
A-level ]20,22] 9.34 4.83 4.80 
 
0.09 0.27 0.18 
 
6.18 3.32 
A-level ]22,24] 10.87 3.25 7.91 
 
0.88 0.09 0.83 
 
9.28 2.65 
A-level ]24,26] 12.06 3.04 15.51 
 
1.07 0.96 0.16 
 
14.16 1.12 
A-level ]26,28] 15.22 5.09 21.05 
 
1.17 0.72 0.66 
 
20.96 0.41 
A-level ]28,30] 18.23 13.56 33.86 
 
1.17 1.03 2.07 
 
40.74 10.16 
Parental occupation           
gp1 7.97 0.61 7.49 
 
0.68 0.19 0.56 
 
9.04 0.36 
gp2 13.60 3.61 17.52 
 
1.01 1.13 2.08 
 
19.20 0.77 
gp3 0.10 1.22 1.07 
 
0.65 0.61 0.01 
 
0.84 0.06 
gp4 0.91 0.61 1.51 
 
0.39 0.08 0.85 
 
0.42 0.38 
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gp5 3.62 0.63 4.23 
 
0.10 0.07 0.84 
 
4.90 1.60 
gp6 0.08 2.19 2.18 
 
0.25 0.70 0.39 
 
0.01 0.24 
gp7 1.58 2.01 3.53 
 
0.18 0.49 1.01 
 
3.07 0.82 
gp8 3.84 1.25 2.64 
 
1.32 0.67 0.29 
 
2.23 0.58 
gp9 0.26 0.61 0.85 
 
0.02 0.13 0.24 
 
0.37 0.16 
gp10 15.44 3.51 19.01 
 
0.26 1.02 1.00 
 
22.05 1.38 
Disability status 1.46 5.15 3.50 
 
0.75 1.31 1.14 
 
2.83 1.40 
School - FE 
institution 14.03 2.77 11.26 
 
0.89 0.00 0.20 
 
16.16 2.28 
School - HE 
institution 2.91 1.45 4.31 
 
0.06 0.61 0.78 
 
3.89 0.27 
School – Independent 14.15 6.61 21.40 
 
1.32 0.87 2.64 
 
24.85 3.62 
School - Unknown 6.85 7.46 14.19 
 
0.12 3.01 2.48 
 
14.61 4.27 
School - State school 9.04 1.36 10.47 
 
0.32 0.92 0.42 
 
12.10 0.25 
White 7.75 5.55 2.46 
 
0.82 1.67 1.18 
 
3.72 3.18 
Black 6.20 2.16 4.07 
 
0.62 0.42 0.23 
 
5.68 1.19 
Indian 4.76 3.62 1.32 
 
0.85 1.17 0.74 
 
2.31 1.29 
Pakistani/Bangladeshi 2.83 0.74 2.12 
 
0.38 0.05 0.01 
 
2.62 0.45 
Chinese 0.33 1.76 2.01 
 
0.44 0.73 0.55 
 
2.45 0.95 
Mixed 0.48 0.15 0.34 
 
0.17 0.18 0.11 
 
0.41 0.08 
Other 3.19 2.95 0.38 
 
0.05 0.84 0.98 
 
0.58 2.95 
Age <18 2.98 0.39 3.44 
 
0.33 0.29 0.70 
 
4.93 0.85 
Age[18,19] 4.49 0.85 3.71 
 
0.12 0.39 0.52 
 
4.58 0.86 
Age [19-20] 0.49 0.94 0.41 
 
0.12 0.39 0.99 
 
0.22 0.99 
Age[20,21] 2.56 2.17 0.50 
 
0.30 0.00 0.38 
 
1.43 1.56 
Age[21,22] 0.29 0.47 0.75 
 
0.46 0.14 1.41 
 
0.01 0.98 
Age[22,23] 4.13 0.31 4.41 
 
0.29 0.33 0.65 
 
4.08 0.10 
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Age[23,24] 1.43 2.21 3.56 
 
0.18 0.50 0.00 
 
4.15 0.20 
Age>24 6.84 1.94 4.93 
 
0.92 0.32 0.44 
 
7.28 0.24 
Fee status 0.23 1.80 1.50 
 
0.88 0.47 0.55 
 
0.05 1.23 
Subject of studies           
Medicine 10.35 6.68 17.50 
 
1.17 1.82 2.15 
 
17.66 2.46 
Sub. Allied to Med. 0.53 0.73 1.24 
 
0.46 0.03 0.16 
 
2.75 2.13 
Biology 3.09 1.13 2.04 
 
0.30 0.10 0.11 
 
3.70 1.76 
Physics 4.86 1.53 3.46 
 
0.63 0.05 0.01 
 
3.19 1.35 
Math 7.32 2.77 10.27 
 
0.87 0.78 1.12 
 
10.02 0.26 
Engineering 3.05 1.08 4.13 
 
0.73 0.66 0.70 
 
5.38 0.32 
Architecture 1.95 1.75 3.64 
 
0.06 0.11 0.57 
 
3.56 1.64 
Social studies 2.85 3.97 0.95 
 
0.57 0.48 0.82 
 
0.51 1.51 
Law 4.49 1.91 6.43 
 
0.31 0.70 0.02 
 
7.78 0.68 
Business and admin. 11.43 4.15 15.49 
 
0.16 1.68 1.41 
 
17.02 0.77 
Communication 7.52 2.32 5.21 
 
0.92 0.53 0.47 
 
7.56 1.80 
Linguistic 6.23 0.13 6.26 
 
1.01 0.14 0.01 
 
6.33 0.19 
Literature 7.55 1.85 9.62 
 
1.08 0.37 0.81 
 
9.60 0.10 
History/Philosophy 7.53 2.19 9.88 
 
0.79 0.63 0.51 
 
10.74 0.50 
Arts 8.78 1.96 10.62 
 
0.25 0.80 1.12 
 
12.43 3.07 
Education 6.91 6.50 0.75 
 
1.62 1.18 1.23 
 
3.58 0.39 
Other 1.50 0.72 2.18 
 
0.19 0.51 0.41 
 
3.47 0.23 
Sport sciences 10.66 3.89 6.71 
 
1.34 0.57 0.48 
 
9.08 2.20 
Psychology 0.91 0.37 1.27 
 
0.14 0.15 0.01 
 
2.23 0.62 
IT 4.65 3.08 7.62 
 
0.27 0.75 0.94 
 
6.44 0.68 
Economics 7.02 0.21 7.47 
 
1.03 0.05 0.42 
 
8.49 0.11 
Finance/Accounting 3.18 2.74 5.81 
 
0.26 1.38 1.40 
 
6.01 0.26 
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Mixed no science 3.21 1.71 1.58 
 
0.84 0.63 0.42 
 
2.30 1.12 
Mixed half science 2.08 0.43 2.50 
 
1.12 0.30 1.36 
 
0.40 0.34 
Mixed 100% science 4.66 0.72 5.50 
 
0.68 0.37 1.15 
 
7.14 1.12 
Region of residence           
UK not specified 1.70 0.10 1.86 
 
0.61 0.07 0.07 
 
0.93 0.42 
Channel Island 1.52 2.78 1.19 
 
0.07 0.35 0.39 
 
0.74 0.54 
Isle of Man 0.26 1.96 2.16 
 
0.26 0.35 0.57 
 
1.40 0.83 
England not specified 5.68 3.23 2.56 
 
1.39 1.21 0.74 
 
3.39 1.35 
Wales 1.37 1.19 0.23 
 
0.00 0.27 0.04 
 
0.48 1.07 
Scotland 13.03 0.58 13.99 
 
1.44 0.65 2.30 
 
10.78 3.47 
N. Ireland 9.69 17.97 7.67 
 
2.02 5.26 1.17 
 
1.61 4.39 
East Anglia 1.47 0.19 1.67 
 
0.40 0.13 0.07 
 
2.35 0.29 
East Midlands 6.29 1.90 4.46 
 
0.77 0.33 0.91 
 
3.66 1.58 
greater London 1.04 3.64 2.44 
 
0.54 0.94 1.15 
 
2.44 3.07 
rest of the world 4.22 0.04 4.23 
 
0.18 0.25 0.57 
 
4.25 3.07 
North 5.81 7.35 1.13 
 
0.58 1.60 1.11 
 
1.73 0.57 
North West 4.05 0.01 4.06 
 
0.20 0.24 0.07 
 
5.18 0.64 
South East 3.66 1.99 1.78 
 
0.47 0.60 0.76 
 
4.12 0.62 
South West 2.20 1.67 0.61 
 
0.35 0.45 0.14 
 
0.53 0.09 
West Midlands 2.51 2.53 0.11 
 
0.45 0.65 0.04 
 
3.03 1.29 
Yorkshire 7.68 3.86 3.97 
 
1.09 0.84 0.71 
 
5.46 0.69 
Region of Institution           
North East 2.00 13.88 10.99 
 
0.79 4.44 2.30 
 
2.73 1.93 
Yorkshire & Humber. 5.11 3.56 8.57 
 
0.01 0.89 3.24 
 
6.42 0.54 
North West 5.90 0.23 6.13 
 
0.11 0.30 0.38 
 
10.72 1.53 
East Midlands 5.15 2.29 2.96 
 
0.42 0.44 1.58 
 
2.11 1.77 
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Eastern 3.60 3.84 0.05 
 
2.51 0.60 0.17 
 
10.12 5.22 
South East 5.48 6.17 0.42 
 
1.30 1.54 0.31 
 
1.98 4.16 
London 4.60 9.14 4.02 
 
1.38 2.98 3.65 
 
4.97 9.22 
South West 0.39 5.84 6.04 
 
0.09 1.26 1.34 
 
5.24 3.71 
West Midlands 4.89 7.41 2.11 
 
0.85 1.94 0.87 
 
4.34 0.80 
Scotland 15.16 1.56 17.22 
 
1.52 0.71 2.48 
 
13.17 3.87 
Wales 5.29 2.56 2.90 
 
1.27 0.48 0.57 
 
0.05 3.80 
Northern Ireland 10.69 22.02 10.63 
 
2.04 5.38 1.29 
 
0.78 5.08 
Note: Column 1 to 3 reports the value of t-test of mean differences of each covariate between observation in tier i and observations in the other 
two tiers of the institutional quality distribution. Column 4 to 6 reports the t-tests after blocking on GPS using 5 blocks. The mean differences are 
computed within each block and then the weighted average over the 5 blocks is reported for each tier. Column 7 reports t-test on the coefficient 
of treatment in a regression of covariate k. Column 8 reports the same t-test when conditioning on the predicted treatment value.  
 
 
 Table 5: Robustness Checks 
 
Excluding 
institution
s with 
interview 
process  Female Male 
Quality 
exclude 
graduate 
prospect 
Quality: 
Research, 
expenditure
, student 
staff ratio 
Discrete measure      
OLS estimates      
Quality 2 0.026* 0.020 0.028 0.022 0.025* 
 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.019) (0.014) 
Quality 3 0.044*** 0.049** 0.036 0.042** 0.048** 
 
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) 
Quality 4  0.065*** 0.074*** 0.063** 0.052*** 0.056*** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.019) (0.019) 
Propensity score 
matching 
 
  
  
Quality 2 vs Quality 1 0.006 0.013 -0.023 0.022 0.016 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.044) (0.025) (0.021) 
Quality 3 vs Quality 2 0.044** 0.051** -0.019 0.023 0.030** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.037) (0.020) (0.015) 
Quality 4 vs Quality 3 0.039** 0.033 0.026 0.047** 0.033** 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.031) (0.018) (0.019) 
      
Continuous measure      
OLS estimates      
Quality score 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.025** 0.028*** 0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) 
Quality score square 0.010* 0.002 0.013* 0.008* 0.005 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
Continuous Treatment 
Matching 
 
  
  
E[W/T=1] 
9.942 
(0.009) 
9.890 
(0.036) 
9.956 
(0.015) 
9.892 
(0.052) 
9.915 
(0.036) 
E[W/T=2] 
9.924 
(0.006) 
9.892 
(0.023) 
9.953 
(0.004) 
9.902 
(0.022) 
9.918 
(0.015) 
E[W/T=3] 
9.976 
(0.023) 
9.964 
(0.030) 
10.024 
(0.004) 
9.993 
(0.008) 
9.984 
(0.014) 
E[W/T=4] 
10.044 
(0.032) 
10.025 
(0.040) 
10.099 
(0.011) 
10.064 
(0.009) 
10.086 
(0.011) 
Note: OLS estimates are based on the full specification details of which are available in Table 2.  
Propensity score matching is estimated using the full set of controls, details of which are found in 
Table 3 
Continuous Treatment Matching is based on a propensity score estimated with the full set of 
parameters as explained in Figure 5. Standard errors are based on bootstrapping with 500 replications. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% statistical level respectively. 
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Annex 1: 
 
Table A1: Sample Selection: 
Selection criteria – applied 
incrementaly 
Number of observations 
Original sample 19,979 
First degree only 11,866 
Age on graduation [19,25] 9,850 
Not special entry student 9,738 
Measure of institution quality 8,500 
Earnings non missing 7,508 
FT employee 7,007 
Earnings < £60,000 6986 
Note: Longitudinal Destination of Leavers from Higher Education (2002/03) 
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Table A2: Distribution of Subject by Institutional Quality 
 
Subject Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total 
      Medicine and Dentistry 0.00 0.00 2.83 9.52 3.04 
Sub. allied to Medicine 7.12 7.39 5.56 4.96 6.26 
Biology, vet, agri. 2.83 4.98 6.10 6.03 4.97 
Physics 3.46 5.17 5.69 6.43 5.18 
Mathematics 0.80 0.82 3.81 5.49 2.71 
Engineering and Tech. 5.60 6.76 7.71 9.02 7.26 
Architecture and 
Planning 
1.47 3.84 1.12 0.97 1.85 
Social Studies 4.58 6.27 7.76 5.60 6.05 
Law 2.79 2.08 6.06 5.81 4.18 
Business and 
administration 
18.31 19.53 6.81 3.05 11.97 
Communication 4.98 1.90 1.15 0.51 2.15 
Linguistic and Classics 1.66 1.92 5.13 5.07 3.43 
Language and literature 0.44 0.94 2.60 6.07 2.49 
History and Philosophy 1.80 0.95 6.17 7.97 4.20 
Creative Arts 10.72 8.22 4.37 1.30 6.19 
Education 3.95 1.76 1.02 1.66 2.11 
Sport science 4.62 1.35 1.28 0.14 1.87 
psychology 3.72 3.27 3.62 2.23 3.22 
IT 8.32 7.82 5.81 3.20 6.31 
Economics 0.23 0.55 2.48 3.91 1.78 
Finance & Accounting 2.55 2.55 1.71 0.17 1.75 
mixed no science 3.94 2.65 3.38 2.90 3.22 
Mixed 45-55 science 4.74 7.19 5.98 5.14 5.76 
Mixed 100% science 0.41 1.10 1.40 2.65 1.38 
Other 0.98 0.99 0.45 0.23 0.67 
      
Observations 1783 1732 1758 1713 6986 
Note: for each column, a cell reports the fraction of individuals in that subject. The 
total row reports the number of individuals. 
 
 
 
 
 
